For decades, the balance of the Cold War relied on a paradox: avoiding a nuclear war while meticulously preparing for its outbreak. Through declassified archives, historians are now discovering the extent of the plans developed by the major powers to strike the enemy. These documents show how close the world has sometimes come to a global conflict.
The logic of nuclear deterrence
After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union entered an unprecedented strategic confrontation. The possession of nuclear weapons profoundly transformed military strategy. The goal was no longer just to win a war but to prevent the enemy from initiating it. This logic of deterrence is based on a certainty: any nuclear attack would provoke an immediate and devastating response. To make this threat credible, both camps develop extremely detailed plans that outline the targets, means, and timing of a massive strike. These plans are regularly updated according to the evolution of the arsenals and military capabilities of the adversaries.
Plans for massive attacks
Among the declassified documents are programs that reveal the scale of this planning. In the United States, the plan known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP, envisages simultaneous strikes against thousands of targets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries as early as the 1960s. Strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear submarines must act in a coordinated manner to destroy industrial centers, military bases, and strategic infrastructure of the adversaries. Soviet strategists, on their part, develop similar scenarios targeting American bases and major Western cities. These plans are based on the idea that a nuclear war, if it were to happen, would be total and extremely swift.
A world on the brink multiple times
Reading these archives also reveals how dangerous certain episodes of the Cold War were. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 remains the most famous example of a confrontation on the verge of escalating into a nuclear war. But other lesser-known incidents, such as false alerts in detection systems or radar interpretation errors, also came close to triggering an uncontrolled escalation. In several cases, the decision of an officer or the caution of a political leader prevented the worst. In hindsight, historians emphasize that the stability of nuclear deterrence has relied as much on strategic mechanisms as on a combination of composure and luck.
