INTERVIEW. The president of the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, Maged al-Madhaji, explains how Houthi rebels allied with Iran are able to disrupt energy flows in the Red Sea.
It’s an unexpected turn in the war that is inflaming the Middle East. Just over a month after the start of American-Israeli bombardments in Iran, the Houthi rebels claimed their first attack on Israel on Saturday, March 28. The entry into war of this group allied with the Islamic Republic is all the more surprising as this member of the “Axis of Resistance” pro-Iranian alliance – the alliance of non-state paramilitary groups anti-American and anti-Israeli favored by Iran for nearly forty years – had been relatively discreet since the beginning of the war on February 28.
President and co-founder of the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, an independent think tank founded in 2014 in Aden, in southwestern Yemen, Maged al-Madhaji is one of the country’s top experts. In an interview with Le Point, this political scientist and human rights activist decrypts the reasons that led the Houthis to join the fight alongside Iran.
Le Point: Are you surprised that the Houthis have finally decided to enter the war by striking Israel?
Maged al-Madhaji: Not at all. This reaction was expected from the start. The question was closely related to what we consider the “operational management” of the “Axis of Resistance,” largely led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. While there are indeed divergence of calculations between different components of the Houthi movement, the final decision ultimately rests with the leadership, in this case Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. He remains ideologically committed and deeply aligned with the conflict in its jihadist dimension.
How do you explain the fact that the Houthis waited a month before joining the battle?
This can be understood as part of a deliberate approach of the axis to support and manage the pace of the Houthis’ engagement. The timing of their intervention appears to be linked to two key factors.
First, the increasing pressure on Tehran, both on its military capacities and on Hezbollah. Secondly, the growing likelihood of a broader military evolution, including possible ground operations and efforts to neutralize Iranian pressure in the Strait of Hormuz.
What, in your opinion, is the war objective of the Houthis?
In this context, the activation of the Houthi front aims to generate additional pressure in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb strait, as well as on Israel on several levels. This intervention simultaneously fulfills several objectives. Firstly, it sends a clear message: the axis retains the ability to expand the conflict. Secondly, it creates concrete pressure on the allocation of military resources, both for Israel and the United States, by adding a new operational constraint. Thirdly, it signals an increased risk of disruption to global energy and commercial flows – especially as the threat extends to the Red Sea, which remains a crucial outlet for Gulf oil exports via the Yanbu corridor.
The relationship [of the Houthis with Tehran] is not identical to that with Hezbollah, but it remains organic and deeply intertwined.
Ultimately, this initiative reflects both a functional necessity related to negotiations, an attempt to test Israeli and American defensive and offensive systems, as well as a warning of a possible new shock to the global economy through targeting energy routes in the Red Sea.
Do you believe that the Houthis could block the Bab el-Mandeb strait?
Yes, they do have the capacity to significantly disrupt – and potentially block – the Bab el-Mandeb strait. As long as the Houthis maintain a presence along the western coast of Yemen and on adjacent islands, they can pose a serious threat to maritime traffic. Even with relatively simple means – such as naval mines, unmanned surface vessels, drones, fast attack craft, and anti-ship missile systems – they are capable of creating a high-risk environment for ships in transit. This situation is likely to persist unless a significant ground operation along the coast is launched to push them out of these strategic positions.
Do the Houthis actually have the ability to strike Israel, considering that most of their ballistic missile attacks after October 7, 2023 have been intercepted by Israeli air defense?
The significance of Houthi actions against Israel does not primarily lie in their ability to inflict direct damage through missiles or drones. In fact, the geographical distance between Yemen and Israel limits their ability to make a significant direct impact.
However, their role is important in other respects. Firstly, they help saturate and bypass Israeli air defense systems, which can create openings for Iran and Hezbollah to carry out more effective strikes. Secondly, they increase economic pressure on Israel by targeting the port of Eilat, thereby disrupting an important maritime outlet. Thirdly, they impose an operational constraint by forcing Israel to redirect some of its military resources – initially intended for Iran and Hezbollah – to the Yemeni front, which is a negative development for Tel Aviv.
Moreover, the broader threat posed to energy flows and the potential disruption of maritime routes in the Red Sea generate international pressure, indirectly leading to an additional constraint for Israel.
To what extent do the Houthis obey the Islamic Republic of Iran?
The relationship is not identical to that of Hezbollah, but it remains organic and deeply intertwined. The Houthis and Iran do not align entirely doctrinally: although the Houthis are broadly part of the Shiite sphere, they are not duodecimal, creating a distinct framework for their relationship with Tehran.
They do not follow the supreme leader in the same direct religious sense as Hezbollah. However, this distinction does not detract from the fact that the Iranian state has been decisive in the emergence and development of the Houthi movement – politically, militarily, and in terms of security structures.
The Houthis have engaged in a conflict for which they have no direct national interest.
Strategically, the movement does not make major decisions without thorough consultation with Tehran. While the Houthis retain some maneuvering space, especially to manage domestic priorities, their independent range of action on broader regional issues remains limited.
Does the entry into war by the Houthis correspond to an order from Tehran?
In terms of strategic decisions – particularly those related to war and peace – it is highly unlikely that such decisions are made without direct Iranian involvement. Recent developments confirm this assessment: the Houthis have engaged in a conflict for which they have no direct national interest, at least beyond the ideological framework.
Even the narrative of “direct defense of Palestine” does not materialize materially in the current dynamics of the conflict. Therefore, it can be said that the Houthis are strategically very close to Tehran. Their participation in this confrontation largely reflects Iranian interests and responds to the broader strategic needs of Tehran.
Can it be said that the Houthis have now replaced Hezbollah as the main asset of the Islamic Republic abroad?
It would not be accurate to describe the Houthis as a replacement for Hezbollah, which remains a direct extension of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, unlike the Houthis. Instead, they are a strategic ally of the Pasdaran, with deep and convergent interests.
However, it can be argued that they are increasingly becoming Iran’s most important regional strategic asset – probably the most resilient and capable of exerting extensive impact. They now have the ability to threaten the Gulf and the Bab el-Mandeb strait. In this sense, the added strategic value of the Houthis is significantly higher. This is a reality understood by the Houthis themselves, by Iran, and increasingly by the international community.
How have previous military operations conducted by the United States and Israel against the Houthis affected the movement?
It can be argued that most American and Israeli military actions – whether targeting military or dual-use infrastructure – have had a significant impact on the Houthis, although not irreversible. Now, despite the multiple intensive campaigns by the United States and Israel against them in the past year, Iran has managed to considerably increase the volume and sophistication of weapons transfers to the group.
This has been partly facilitated by the lack of sustained and effective maritime surveillance along the Yemeni coast, following the reduction of naval control previously provided by the Saudi-led coalition. As a result, the Houthis have been able to offset much of the damage caused by American and Israeli strikes. However, it should be noted that operations targeting the political and security leadership of the movement have had a deeper and lasting effect on decision-making structures within the movement.
Therefore, can the United States and its allies truly counter the Houthis?
Without a parallel local ground effort capable of reducing the Houthis’ ability to govern and maintain their military operations, such strike-based approaches will only produce temporary disruption or short-term decrease in capabilities. As long as supply and smuggling networks remain active, the Houthis will continue to regenerate their capabilities. Particularly concerning is that the Houthis, in coordination with Iran, have pinpointed missile and military production elements, giving them a more direct ability to compensate for their losses.
Furthermore, they have expanded their external connections by engaging with other actors who see them as a relatively low-cost partner to challenge Western influence in this strategically vital region. Therefore, countering the Houthi challenge requires a different type of military approach – one that goes beyond airstrikes and targeted assassinations – which rather involves a credible military effort, anchored locally and supported by international partners, as repeatedly called for by anti-Houthi actors on the ground.
