FIGAROVOX/TRIBUNE -ÂEmmanuel Macron’s visit to Japan, planned for this week, comes at a time of strong tensions, leaving room for a strategic rapprochement between Tokyo and Paris, analyzes Valérie Niquet, political scientist and essayist.
Researcher, political scientist and essayist, Valérie Niquet is an Asia specialist at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS). She is notably the author ofChinese power in 100 questions(Editions Tallandier, 2021).
Beyond the cherry trees, which could be in bloom, President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Japan at the end of March comes at a particularly interesting moment of strategic convergence. It could mark a step in the concrete strengthening of Franco-Japanese cooperation in matters of security and defense, in an increasingly complex international environment, but also in the implementation of a bilateral road map 2023-2027 which is still struggling to produce fully visible effects.
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On the Tokyo side, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will have just returned from Washington, where her discussions with President Trump focused on burden sharing, operational expectations of the United States and the role of allies in crisis scenarios, Taiwan Strait in the Gulf. These discussions, and the brutality of Trumpian demands, can only fuel Japanese reflection already underway on the limits of too exclusive dependence, including in sensitive areas such as supply chains or critical technologies.
In this context, the French position can only arouse interest, far from the eternal suspicion towards Paris which allows itself to criticize the American ally. France is a power present in the Pacific, with territories, forces and lasting interests in the region. Above all, it has recently demonstrated its operational credibility. Its commitment in the Mediterranean illustrates its ability to make a concrete contribution to maritime security in a degraded environment. This presence is also part of a more global reading of the interdependence of theaters, between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security.
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Limited exercises
Traditionally, Tokyo has a very strong bias in favor of the United Kingdom. After all, at the time of the Meiji Restoration, the British chose the “good side”, that of the Emperor, while the French engaged alongside the shogunal forces. The United Kingdom is also the first Western country with which Japan signed a treaty of friendship and commerce, in 1854. Finally, London is still perceived as the closest ally of the United States. For Japan, this is much more comfortable than dealing with the French whose position of strategic autonomy is all the less understood as the majority of Japanese experts are trained in the United Kingdom or the United States; and that within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the office in charge of relations with Washington remains by far the most influential.
But with the war in Iran, the British posture appears more hesitant. London has certainly sent an aircraft carrier to Japan in 2025, in a prestigious operation welcomed with enthusiasm. However, in the Mediterranean and the Gulf, the Royal Navy can only engage, with delay, a frigate, when France deploys a much larger device, including a carrier group and several frigates. This difference in capabilities cannot escape Japanese observers in a context where reliability and continuity count as much as announcements.
The Middle East, and in particular the security of energy routes in the Strait of Hormuz, constitutes an area of coordination already active between Paris and Tokyo
Emmanuel Macron’s visit thus offers the opportunity to strengthen cooperation in matters of security and defense, beyond what already exists. Joint exercises between the Japanese self-defense forces and the French forces have increased, but still remain limited. The signing of the RAA agreement facilitating joint exercises and deployments – long discussed but still not finalized – could constitute a concrete signal. Beyond that, cooperation could extend to key areas such as maritime surveillance, space, cyber and even the protection of critical infrastructure.
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Capacity for regular consultation
The economic security aspect constitutes another central project. Since 2024, France and Japan have engaged in a structured dialogue on the resilience of supply chains, in particular for critical minerals, the protection of sensitive technologies and coordination in the face of economic coercion practices. In a context of high tension, where China does not hesitate to resort to economic coercion, it is less a question of decoupling than of securing interdependencies considered strategic, in coordination with the frameworks of the G7, of which France holds the presidency in 2026.
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Finally, the consultations should give an important place to the management of international crises. The Middle East, and in particular the security of energy routes in the Strait of Hormuz, constitutes an area of coordination already active between Paris and Tokyo. The war in Ukraine and the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia, stability in East Asia and the North Korean question complete this agenda. On these issues, the issue is less about producing announcements than about asserting a capacity for regular consultation between two powers who share the same understanding of the risks.
Finally, the notion of “strategic autonomy” defended by France, long perceived with caution in Tokyo, could be reassessed in the light of exchanges with Washington. Even if Japan’s position remains extremely constrained, for reasons of foreign policy as well as domestic policy. Beyond the declarations of principles, the conditions come together to move from a convergence of views to concrete progress.
