The parliamentary elections in Japan last February led to a record electoral victory for the Liberal Democratic Party (PLD), consolidating the position of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who has been in office since October 2025. With her comes the nationalist, even revisionist, movement within her party. It is hard to say whether the Japanese Prime Minister, heir to Shinzo Abe, assassinated in July 2022, gained such significant support thanks to – or despite – this radicalism. But many signs suggest that an increasing portion of the public sees the international environment as worrying and voted for a stable government capable of acting.
If Sanae Takaichi manages to make a real shift in Japan’s foreign policy, it will likely be less due to her beliefs than because Japan currently finds itself in a more vulnerable position than its predecessors. Will the recent visit to Washington by the Japanese Prime Minister, endorsed by Donald Trump, shuffle the cards in a very tense international context?
The never-ending post-war period for Japan may be coming to an end. For eighty years, Japan has pursued a discreet foreign policy often described as pacifist, under the shadow of the United States, which guaranteed its security. This subordination, born from Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, has become a kind of almost existential dependence, even more marked than that which characterized some countries in the Atlantic Alliance.
The United States pledged to protect Japan in exchange for the establishment of a network of military bases in the Japanese archipelago. This alliance had a numbing effect on the population, but within the political class, it has emerged as a source of frustration.
Despite certain reforms, the post-war paradigm has generally persisted, and pacifism has remained an essential component of Japanese identity.
The significant rise in military power by China is gradually giving them the capacity, in a crisis, to exclude other powers from the South and East China Seas. Ultimately, Beijing’s ambition is evidently to challenge American strategic dominance in the Pacific region.
The United States’ intentions are currently more challenging to decipher, particularly regarding the crucial question of Taiwan’s future. President Donald Trump and his advisors emphasized Taiwan’s unique competence in high-tech semiconductor production. They argue that Taiwan must be defended for this reason while also proposing that this expertise should be transferred to the United States. The consequences of a potential comprehensive agreement between Washington and Beijing remain very uncertain for Taiwan. Just a glance at the map is enough to understand Japan’s vulnerability in case of Taiwan’s annexation.
In addition to these uncertainties, North Korea has solidified its status as a de facto nuclear power, equipped with advanced missile technologies, likely developed with Russia’s help. In Tokyo, the North Korean participation in the Russian aggression war in Ukraine and China’s “benevolent neutrality” toward this war are seen as the consolidation of an aggressive military bloc seeking to alter power dynamics in Northeast Asia.
Regarding the United States, the most urgent task is to convince Washington that Japan takes security threats seriously and does not intend to take advantage of the system without making contributions.
Fundamentally, Japan has only two options: to continue relying on the alliance with the United States or to move closer to China and eventually integrate into its sphere of influence. This “Asian path” has always existed in Japanese political thought, resting on the perception of equality with China (17th-18th centuries) and then Japanese domination (1868-1945).
The latest Prime Minister to advocate a pro-China approach, Yukio Hatoyama (2009-2010), did not want to break ties with the United States but dreamt of an Asian peace order, similar to European hopes just after the end of the Cold War. Today, the pro-China wing of Japanese politics is significantly weakened. Towards the United States, the most urgent task is to convince Washington that Japan takes security threats seriously and does not plan to take advantage of the system without making contributions.
Revising the Constitution and strengthening defense are two key issues for Sanae Takaichi
Two measures of strong symbolic value and therefore very controversial domestically, invoked by Sanae Takaichi during her election campaign, are the revision of the Constitution and the relaxation of Japan’s ban on hosting or introducing nuclear weapons on its soil.
Constitutional revision requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament. The PLD holds such a majority in the House of Representatives and could potentially achieve it in the Senate after the 2028 elections. Then, a majority must be obtained in a referendum. No government has yet initiated a politically risky process. As for the introduction of nuclear weapons, it could provoke strong opposition but would only require a government decision.
Strengthening Japan’s military capabilities represents a major and costly challenge. Japan’s defense budget has just reached 2% of its GDP. An increase of this percentage has been announced, but its funding remains uncertain. Sanae Takaichi seems to want to promote growth through an industrial policy partly focused on defense and financed by borrowing – a complex approach for a country whose public debt exceeds 230% of GDP. The sluggishness of the Japanese economy also does not encourage the government to raise taxes.
In addition to increasing its military capabilities, Japan must enhance the combat readiness of its self-defense forces: unified command of different branches, better operational coordination with the United States, investments in cyber and space, reallocation of resources from the army to the navy and air force, as well as the development of offensive weapon systems, which have long been considered contrary to the Constitution.
Expanding Alliances
For Sanae Takaichi, the challenge also lies in continuing Shinzo Abe’s initiative to expand alliances. His major diplomatic project was the promotion of a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” which caught the attention of Donald Trump during his first term but has since waned in Washington. After China, Japan is the largest infrastructure investor in Asia and has developed security cooperation with countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
However, Japan alone cannot change the fact that, in the eyes of many regional states, China appears to be a more visible partner than the United States. In a broad geopolitical vision, Shinzo Abe revived the Quad (United States, India, Japan, Australia) in 2017, but this forum has currently lost momentum, likely due to tensions between Washington and New Delhi. In contrast, bilateral cooperation between Japan and Australia has gained substance in recent years and could potentially evolve into a more formal strategic alliance.
With the European Union (EU), Japan has concluded a trade agreement and a strategic partnership agreement, the psychological effect of which should not be underestimated, even if the EU’s real geopolitical weight in East Asia remains limited. Japan’s support for Ukraine is also significant, reaching approximately $20 billion to date.
Since the end of World War II, the territorial dispute between Japan and Russia over four of the Kuril Islands, located north of Japan and annexed by the USSR in the final days of the conflict, remains unresolved. In the defense equipment domain, Japan has, for the first time, engaged in a strategic project outside the American framework, developing the next-generation combat aircraft (Global Combat Air Programme) alongside the UK and Italy.
Deep-rooted tensions with South Korea continue to profoundly affect relations. However, both Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung have underlined the importance of enhancing bilateral cooperation to ease tensions in a complex regional context. Lee Jae-myung has even expressed his desire for a trilateral dialogue between Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing in a typical South Korean manner.
A New Diplomatic Crisis with China
For the time being, Sanae Takaichi is hardly in a position to engage in dialogue with Beijing following the crisis triggered by her declaration on November 7, 2025, before the Japanese Parliament. She stated that Japan’s vital interests would undoubtedly be threatened if China resorted to force in a crisis with Taiwan. By invoking the 2015 constitutional reinterpretation, she insinuated that Japan could militarily intervene in such a situation.
Undoubtedly, this was a deliberate attempt to break the taboo Japan had long imposed on itself regarding security policy. China responded vigorously, blocking the export of strategic metals and partially reducing the flow of Chinese tourists, without swaying Sanae Takaichi.
The Prime Minister acknowledges that dialogue with Beijing is essential, but she first aims to restore a climate of respect in bilateral relations. Industrial and commercial interests between the two countries remain crucial, as China remains by far Japan’s most important partner, and the entire Japanese economy depends on the proper functioning of this relationship. Other strategic reasons support the continuation of dialogue between Tokyo and Beijing: avoiding misunderstandings and allowing Japan to defend its own interests and not just suffer the consequences of potential Sino-American agreements.
Like all Japanese Prime Ministers, Sanae Takaichi must now manage countless conflicting interests, not only within her party but also within a Japanese society characterized by profound inertia. But if the Prime Minister proves pragmatic, external threats could accelerate reforms and naturally lead the country to end the long post-war period.
