China-Iran: Is the relationship balanced?
China is a crucial partner for Iran. It received over 80% of Iranian oil exports in 2025, making it a primary source of revenue for a heavily sanctioned state, according to analysis company Kpler. The reverse is less true. Iranian oil represents about 13% of China’s maritime oil imports, according to Kpler.
Between the two, the relationship is transactional. “China is primarily interested in Iran as a source of cheap oil,” explains William Figueroa, a specialist in Sino-Iranian relations at the University of Groningen (Netherlands). However, Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional rival affected by its strikes, was also as significant as Iran in terms of barrels directly imported by China via sea in 2025, according to Kpler.
Iraq, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates are also suppliers. Iran’s neighbors generally offer what Iran does but in a more stable environment favorable to the United States,” says Mr. Figueroa.
China has realized only a small part of a commitment made in 2021 to invest $400 billion in Iran over 25 years. The volume of China’s trade with Iran reached $9.96 billion in 2025, far from the $108 billion with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Does China militarily support Iran?
China strongly disapproved of American and Israeli strikes. It implicitly criticized Iranian strikes against regional countries and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. There is no clear sign of China providing military support to Iran. “Beijing has refrained from any overt military involvement, preferring restraint and diplomacy,” observes John Calabrese, a researcher at the Middle East Institute in Washington.
It is possible that Iran uses the Chinese BeiDou satellite navigation system for its strikes, as suggested by former French intelligence high official Alain Juillet on the independent podcast Tocsin.
In the past, China has provided drones and dual-use chemicals to Iran, and has “probably shared intelligence” with Iran, says Mr. Figueroa. Beijing denied reports that Chinese semiconductor manufacturer Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, SMIC, had sent material to Iran.
Beijing and Tehran are not bound by a formal military pact, and Chinese leaders refuse to be dragged into the conflict. China did not respond to a request from American President Donald Trump who wanted to see it contribute to reopening the Strait of Hormuz.
What leverage does China have?
“China’s priorities are stability and continuity: maintaining the flow of energy resources, preserving trade relations, and positioning itself for the post-war influence game,” says Mr. Calabrese. This involves calling for and working towards halting hostilities quickly and increasing diplomatic contacts.
The success of these efforts is uncertain. China found itself in a “delicate diplomatic position by refraining from directly condemning Iran while denouncing violations of Gulf countries’ sovereignty,” comments Andrea Ghiselli, a master of international politics at the University of Exeter (UK).
<p"China hopes the conflict will quickly fizzle out, possibly leading to an American defeat. But its capacity – and willingness – to influence events in this direction should not be overestimated," he cautions.
In 2023, China sent a strong signal of its growing influence in the region by working to restore relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, by 2026, it does not seem to have succeeded in persuading Iran to stop shooting at its neighbors, who are China’s partners.
Opportunities and risks for Beijing
The prospect of entanglement of their major strategic rival, America, is welcomed by the Chinese. However, the war poses significant risks. “This war is a fantastic gift for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, watching the United States tarnish its own prestige,” says Mr. Figueroa.
But the surge in oil prices and the impact on economies worldwide are a threat to China itself. “Its greatest vulnerability lies in the impact this will have on export markets, starting with Europe,” predicts Henry Tugendhat, an expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “as the Chinese economy remains desperately dependent on external demand to support its growth objectives.”
