Home War Conflict in Iran: What Really Changes with the Houthis Entry into War.

Conflict in Iran: What Really Changes with the Houthis Entry into War.

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Interview. The president of the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, Maged al-Madhaji, explains how Houthi rebels allied with Iran are able to disrupt energy flows in the Red Sea.

It’s an unexpected twist in the war that has been raging in the Middle East. Just over a month after the start of American-Israeli bombings in Iran, the Houthi rebels claimed their first attack on Israel on Saturday, March 28. The entry of this group allied with the Islamic Republic into the war is all the more surprising as this member of the pro-Iranian “Axis of Resistance” – an alliance of non-state paramilitary groups anti-American and anti-Israeli backed by Iran for nearly forty years – had remained relatively discreet since the start of the war on February 28.

Co-founder president of the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, an independent think tank founded in 2014 in Aden, in southwest Yemen, Maged al-Madhaji is one of the country’s top experts. In an interview with Le Point, this political analyst and human rights activist decrypts the reasons that led the Houthis to join the fight alongside Iran.

Maged al-Madhaji is the founding president of the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, an independent think tank founded in 2014 in Aden, southwest Yemen.DR

Le Point: Are you surprised that the Houthis have finally decided to enter the war by striking Israel?

Maged al-Madhaji: Not at all. This reaction was expected from the start. The question was closely related to what is considered the “operational management” of the “Axis of Resistance,” largely led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. While there are indeed divergences of calculation between the various components of the Houthi movement, the final decision ultimately lies with the leadership, in this case Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. He remains ideologically committed and deeply aligned with the conflict in its jihadist dimension.

How do you explain that the Houthis waited a month before entering the battle?

This can be understood as part of a deliberate approach by the axis to support and manage the pace of Houthi engagement. The timing of their intervention seems linked to two key factors.

First, the increasing pressure on Tehran, both on its military capabilities and on Hezbollah. Secondly, the growing likelihood of a broader military evolution, including potential ground operations and efforts to neutralize Iranian pressure in the Strait of Hormuz.

What do you think is the war goal of the Houthis?

In this context, the activation of the Houthi front aims to generate additional pressure in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as on Israel at multiple levels. This intervention simultaneously fulfills several objectives. Firstly, it sends a clear message: the axis retains the ability to expand the conflict. Secondly, it creates concrete pressure on the allocation of military resources, both for Israel and the United States, by adding a new operational constraint.

The relationship [of the Houthis with Tehran] is not identical to that with Hezbollah, but it remains organic and deeply intertwined.

Ultimately, this initiative reflects both a functional necessity related to negotiations, an attempt to test Israeli and American defensive and offensive systems, as well as a warning of a possible new shock to the global economy through targeting energy routes in the Red Sea.

Do you think the Houthis are capable of blocking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait?

Yes, they do have the capacity to significantly disrupt – and potentially block – the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. As long as the Houthis maintain a presence along the western coast of Yemen and on adjacent islands, they can pose a serious threat to maritime traffic. Even with relatively simple means – such as naval mines, unmanned surface vessels, drones, fast attack craft, and anti-ship missile systems – they are able to create a high-risk environment for ships in transit. This situation is likely to persist unless a significant ground operation along the coast is conducted to dislodge them from these strategic positions.

Do the Houthis really have the ability to strike Israel, knowing that most of their ballistic missile launches after October 7, 2023 were intercepted by Israeli anti-aircraft defense?

The importance of the actions of the Houthis against Israel does not primarily lie in their ability to inflict direct damage through missiles or drones. Indeed, the geographic distance between Yemen and Israel limits their ability to make a significant direct impact.

However, their role is important in other aspects. Firstly, they contribute to saturating and bypassing Israeli air defense systems, which can create openings for Iran and Hezbollah to carry out more effective strikes. Secondly, they increase economic pressure on Israel by targeting the port of Eilat, disrupting a significant maritime outlet. Thirdly, they impose an operational constraint by forcing Israel to redirect some of its military resources – initially intended for Iran and Hezbollah – to the Yemeni front, which is an unfavorable development for Tel Aviv.